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Abstract 
Feedback provided to eyewitnesses can influence memory for how confident their previous line-
up selections were.  Witnesses given confirming feedback remember being more confident than 
witnesses who are told their selection was incorrect regardless of their accuracy.  This can have a 
powerful impact on judges and juries.  In the current paper, we examine the effect of feedback 
from a snitch.  This manipulation often occurs in real cases, despite that fact that snitches could 
have something to gain from providing information to police.  Our participants witnessed a 
staged crime and then identified the perpetrator from a target-absent line-up.  Two days later, 
participants were provided with feedback and were probed for confidence.  Results show that 
confirming feedback from a snitch has the same effect as a confession made by the actual 
suspect, and disconfirming feedback reduces confidence.  Implications and relation to the extant 
literature on eyewitness confidence are discussed.     
Keywords: Eyewitness Memory; Confidence; Line-up Selection; Informants; Meta-memory;  
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When Snitches Corroborate: Effects of Post-Identification Feedback from a Compromised 
Source 
In 1992, Roy Brown was found guilty of murdering a social service worker.  Although 
Mr. Brown had spoken with others in the victim’s office while trying to obtain custody of his 
child, he had no previous contact with the victim.  As the police were conducting their 
investigation, they were contacted by a man who had met Mr. Brown briefly while serving a 
short jail term.  The informant claimed that Mr. Brown, after leaving jail, had called him and 
confessed to the murder.  Despite the lack of physical evidence, Mr. Brown was convicted and 
served 15 years of his 25-to-life sentence before he was granted access to his case files.  Mr. 
Brown requested that DNA found at the scene be compared to the person he thought was the 
culprit.  He was correct about who committed the murder, and was released soon after 
(InnocenceProject, 2014).  
Roy Brown’s wrongful conviction was cemented by the false secondary confession 
provided by the jailhouse informant.  A secondary confession is when an informant admits that a 
suspect confessed their guilt to them, usually including a detailed description of the crime 
(Neuschatz, Lawson, Swanner, Meissner, & Neuschatz, 2008).  In contrast, the more commonly 
known primary confession is a statement made by a suspect detailing their guilt to authorities 
(Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).  A primary confession is given directly to the police, whereas a 
secondary confession is given to another individual who in turn gives a secondhand account to 
the police.  Secondary confessions are a kind of hearsay evidence, admissible under the 
‘admission against interest’ exception to the general prohibition against hearsay (On Lee v. 
United States., 1952). 
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The Innocence Project (InnocenceProject, 2014) estimates that secondary confession 
evidence accounts for over 15% of wrongful convictions.  A Los Angeles County Grand Jury 
Report (1990) detailed that in the 10 years prior to the report, 233 felony and murder trials in Los 
Angeles County included jailhouse informant testimony.  It was also reported that informants 
obtained case information by checking local media, impersonating a detective, and even calling 
the coroner.  The report also demonstrated significant breakdowns in several areas of the legal 
system, allowing known liars to provide testimony.  While the dangers of, and precautions 
against, false secondary confessions have been an issue of debate within legal communities; 
there is a stark lack of empirical research regarding the subject. 
However, a few researchers have started to investigate this underdeveloped field.  
Swanner, Beike, and Cole (2010) demonstrated that people are willing to provide false secondary 
confessions. The authors adapted the ALT key paradigm (see Kassin & Kiechel, 1996) to 
examine whether participants would be likely to provide false secondary confessions.  In the 
original paradigm, one participant would type while a confederate read aloud which keys to hit.  
Participants were told that striking the ALT key on the computer keyboard would shut down the 
program and all data would be lost. Unbeknownst to the participants, the program crashes after 
60 seconds regardless of which keys are pressed. Swanner et al. replaced the confederate with 
another participant, and both participants (reader and typist) were interrogated after the computer 
crash to see whether they would falsely confess (typists providing false primary confessions and 
readers providing false secondary confessions). The rate of false secondary confession ranged 
from 65% to 96%, increasing when participants were offered an incentive for their confession 
and provided with fake evidence (Swanner et al., 2010). The results clearly demonstrate that 
people will provide a false secondary confession when offered minimal incentives (experimental 
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credit in the current study).  Both the documented accounts of real jailhouse informants and the 
empirical psychological research agree that secondary confessions can be and often are falsified 
for personal gain (LA Grand Jury, 1990; Swanner et al., 2010).   
Clearly, the probative value of information gleaned from informants is quite low for what 
should be obvious reasons.  It is important to note, however, that although informants falsify the 
confessions for personal gain, mock jurors are unable to recognize this connection (Neuschatz, et 
al., 2012). In fact, Neuschatz et al. (2008) investigated the impact of incentives on juror verdict 
decisions in a case involving informant testimony.  They found that mock jurors were not only 
influenced by the presence of informant testimony but also, unable to recognize the incentive as 
a motivation for testifying.  In two experiments, mock jurors read a criminal trial transcript that 
included a secondary confession given by an average citizen, a jailhouse informant, or an 
accomplice witness.  In addition, the accomplice witness and jailhouse informant either did or 
did not receive an incentive for testifying.  Regardless of who provided the secondary 
confession, its presence led to more guilty verdicts than when compared to the no secondary 
confession control.  Additionally, the presence of an incentive had no differential effect on 
verdict decisions (Neuschatz et al., 2008).  Participants were unable to recognize the incentive as 
an additional motivator for the jailhouse informant or accomplice witness to testify even when 
the incentive was explicitly stated (e.g., 5-year sentence reduction).  More specifically, when 
asked about why the jailhouse informant or accomplice would testify participants provided 
personal attributions (e.g., they wanted to help) instead of identifying the incentive as the 
motivating factor.    
Not only are mock jurors insensitive to the contextual constraints (e.g., incentives) that 
may motivate informants to testify, they rate the secondary confession evidence as more 
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persuasive than other forms of evidence (Wetmore, Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 2014).  More 
specifically, in Experiment 3, Wetmore et al. (2014) had mock jurors read four trial summaries 
(murder, rape, theft, assault) each containing only one key piece of evidence (secondary 
confession, primary confession, eyewitness, or no key evidence control) and were asked to make 
verdict decisions in each trial The confession evidence, secondary or primary, provided the 
highest conviction rates no matter which trial type they were featured in.  The two confession 
conditions consistently provided significantly higher conviction rates than the eyewitness or no 
key evidence control (Wetmore et al., 2014; Kassin & Neumann, 1997).  This demonstrates that 
not only is a jailhouse informant believable, but their testimony is very powerful and evaluated in 
much the same way as primary confessions. 
Confession evidence is so persuasive that it may infect other forms of evidence.  In fact 
confession evidence has the power to alter an eyewitness’s identification (Hasel & Kassin, 
2009).  Hasel and Kassin had participants’ witness a live staged crime of a confederate stealing a 
laptop, provide a description of the perpetrator and make an identification from a perpetrator 
absent line-up. Two days later, during phase 2, participants returned and were given feedback 
regarding the accuracy of their decision.  If participants made an identification, they were 
informed that a) the individual they identified had confessed to the crime b) the individual they 
identified denied any involvement c) all individuals denied any involvement or d) another 
individual confessed to the crime, not the one identified by the participant. Participants were then 
given opportunity to change their identification decision. Of particular interest, 60.67% of 
participants who were told another individual had confessed changed their original identification 
to the individual who had confessed.  Furthermore 50% of the participants who did not make an 
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identification in phase 1 and were told there was a confession by a specified individual in phase 
2 altered their new identifications to the specified confessor. 
The type of information received by the eyewitness in Hasel and Kassin (2009) was a 
form of post-identification feedback.  Post-identification feedback occurs when information 
regarding the identification choice (e.g., good you got the guy or the person you chose 
confessed) is given to a witness (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Neuschatz et al., 2005).  Previous 
research has demonstrated that post-identification feedback can have harmful effects on 
witnesses’ retrospective confidence (Lampinen, Scott, Leding, Pratt, & Arnal, 2007; Neuschatz 
et al., 2005; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2003).  The typical post-
identification feedback paradigm consists of four stages. First, participants witness a mock 
crime.  Second, witnesses are made to believe a suspect has been caught and they must identify 
him from a photo line-up, in which the culprit may or may not be present. Third, participants are 
told one of the following: they picked the true culprit (confirming feedback), they picked the 
wrong person (disconfirming feedback) or they are given no feedback. Finally, witnesses 
generally rate their confidence in their decision and answer a series of testimony-relevant 
questions. Typically, the line-up administrator gives post-identification feedback directly to the 
witness. As a result, witness’s retrospective confidence varies as a function of the feedback 
received. Confirmatory feedback leads to a more confident witness (Neuschatz et al, 2005Wells 
and Bradfield, 1998).  Confirming feedback not only increases confidence, but can also distort 
reports of the witnessing experience.  For instance, witnesses who receive confirming feedback 
also indicate that they had a better view of the criminal, paid more attention to the crime, and are 
more willing to testify (Neuschatz et al, 2005; Wells and Bradfield, 1998). Confirmatory 
feedback not only increases witness confidence in their identifications, but also make their 
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testimony seem more believable to jurors, and this occurred independently of the accuracy of the 
eyewitnesses (Douglass, Neuschatz, Imrich, &Wilkinson, 2010).  In this paradigm the line-up 
administrator’s role in the experiment is important because he or she presents the line-up, 
therefore, participants may believe that the line-up administrator knows the identity of the 
culprit.  Hence, any feedback given from the line-up administrator is likely to be believable and 
influence a witness’s decision as in Hasel & Kassin (2009). 
However, a line-up administrator is not the only individual who may potentially provide 
post-identification feedback (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Luus & Wells, 1994; Skagerberg, 2007).  
Confirmatory feedback can affect witnesses even if it comes from a source that has no more 
credibility than themselves – namely a cowitness (Luus & Wells, 1994). Cowitness information 
is any information that two or more witnesses exchange regarding an event that they witness 
together (Luus & Wells, 1994).  Participants witnessed a live staged crime in pairs and were then 
separated, presented with a perpetrator absent line-up, and asked to make an identification. 
Following the identification, participants were given feedback regarding the cowitness’s 
identification (i.e., the other participant) through the experimenter that the same person or a 
different person from the photo line-up was chosen. Generally, witnesses reported a higher level 
of certainty if they were informed that a cowitness identified the same person compared to 
witnesses who received no feedback.  If witnesses were told that the cowitness selected a 
different person, witness retrospective confidence was reduced. This study was one of the first to 
establish that the influence of feedback on confidence is bidirectional. That is, depending on the 
information the witness received, confidence can be inflated or deflated.  
The same bidirectional confidence reports occur when the two witnesses directly discuss 
the identification decisions (Skagerberg, 2007). More specifically, witnesses who agreed were 
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more likely to report a higher level of confidence that they accurately identified the culprit. The 
opposite pattern emerged when witnesses disagreed. Additionally, feedback influenced how 
participants answered testimony-relevant questions. If witnesses agreed they reported having a 
better view of the culprit, paid more attention to the crime, and were more willing to testify in 
court.  Cowitness information appears to be persuasive across many situations.  
Post identification feedback appears to create a host of issues when examining not only 
eyewitness decision-making but eyewitness confidence. First, positive feedback induces a higher 
certainty in witnesses, as well as reporting an overall better witnessing experience (Wells et al., 
1998; Wells et al., 2003; Neuschatz et al., 2005). This occurs whether feedback is from a line-up 
administrator (Wells et al., 1998), is from a cowitness (Skagerberg, 2007), or is regarding other 
evidence (Hasel & Kassin, 2009). The strong effect that post identification feedback has on 
retrospective eyewitness confidence judgment can be traced to the cues-based inference 
conceptualization (Charman & Wells, 2012).  Within this framework, feedback will serve as a 
particularly strong external cue when the ecphoric experience of the witness is weak. For 
instance, when witnesses are presented with an innocent suspect line-up then any form of 
feedback (confirming or disconfirming) will have more weight on confidence than for witnesses 
with a strong ecphoric experience. 
The goal of the present study was to test whether or not the effects of post-identification 
feedback occur when the information is presented by a secondary source (i.e., a jailhouse 
informant – a snitch). Jailhouse informant research has indicated that informant testimony can be 
highly influential (Neuschatz et al., 2008). Based on prior post-identification feedback research 
with cowitnesses we predicted that participants receiving confirming feedback from an informant 
would elevate confidence, whereas receiving disconfirming feedback would decrease witness 
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confidence (Skagerberg, 2007). Additionally, confirmatory feedback would lead to responses 
indicating better witnessing experiences (i.e., indicating higher scores) on testimony-relevant 
questions whereas disconfirming feedback would lead to poorer witnessing experiences (i.e., 
lower scores), than would receiving no feedback.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and ninety-three undergraduates (males = 70) aged 18 to 42 years (M = 
19.42, SD = 2.63) participated to fulfil a research participation requirement for a general 
psychology class.  Of all participants, 83.4% were Caucasian, 5.2% were African American, 
4.7% were Asian, 4.1% were Hispanic, 1% were Middle Eastern/Indian, and 1.6% self-identified 
as ‘other’.  Although 200 participants began the experiment, three were removed because they 
chased the confederate after she stole the laptop and were therefore ineligible to continue on to 
Phase 2, one admitted to knowing the confederate personally, and two confessed to not looking 
up at the confederate at all when she entered the laboratory room.   
Materials 
 Line-ups.  The experimenter took photographs of two female targets’ faces.  Twenty 
images of similar individuals matching the targets’ general descriptions were then selected and 
similarity-rated to the targets using 30 paid workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online 
community where requesters pay workers to take online surveys.  In our task, targets and 
potential foil images were presented side by side, and workers were asked to rate on a scale of 1 
to 7 how similar the two images were to one another, where 1 indicated the least resemblance 
and 7 indicated the most resemblance.  Workers were paid 25 cents for their participation, which 
lasted on average less than five minutes.  The six most similar to Target 1 (M = 4.18, SD = 1.41) 
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and Target 2 (M = 4.69, SD = 1.32) were used to construct two target-absent simultaneous line-
ups on 8 1/2” by 11” paper with two rows of photographs numbered ‘1’ through ‘6’ from the top 
left to the bottom right. 
Pre-Identification Interview Questions.  A mock ‘incident report’ resembling one used by 
actual police investigators was created for the experimenter’s use during the pre-identification 
interview as a simple way to ensure that all pertinent questions were addressed and to render the 
cover story more convincing. The first question was open-ended, asking, ‘Can you tell me in 
your own words what happened when the person stole the laptop?’ This question was followed 
by more detailed questions designed to retrieve information about the thief’s appearance, attire, 
and actions while in the experiment room in case they were not addressed in the initial 
description.  
Procedure 
 Phase 1.  Participants entered the experiment room one at a time believing they were 
going to participate in a study about persuasive techniques. The experimenter told the participant 
that because the current computers in the room were too old to run the experiment, it must be run 
on a laptop that the experimenter brought in the room and set in front of the participant. The 
experimenter then claiming to forget bringing a USB drive for the experiment, handed a brief 
overview of persuasive techniques to the participant, and left the room for two minutes to 
retrieve the drive.  A female confederate entered the room wearing ear buds playing prerecorded 
spoken instructions from the experimenter mixed in the left channel of audio (facing away from 
the participant) while a clip of a currently popular song played in the right channel, which 
dangled freely rather than being placed in the confederate’s ear.  This helped to lower the 
possibility of the participant hearing the instructions being given in the left channel. The 
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prerecorded instructions also ensured that time spent in the room was the same across sessions 
and between confederates. The instructions were ‘Enter the experiment room,’ and ‘Now take 
the laptop and leave the room. Don’t turn around, and leave the door open.’  The confederate 
remained in the room for 15 seconds shuffling through boxes under a desk opposite the 
participant then turned around, grabbed the laptop, and left the room when instructed. The 
experimenter returned, feigned distress at the theft of the laptop, and ran out in the direction in 
which the participant indicated the confederate left.  
 The experimenter reentered the room and told the participant that she or he was actually a 
criminal justice student working on a simulated criminal investigation project, and the participant 
must provide a description of the thief and everything that occurred so that the experimenter may 
solve the crime using resources and techniques like those of real police investigators. The 
experimenter then filled out an ‘incident report’ containing detailed questions about the thief and 
left the room for ten minutes, claiming that she or he needed to enter the information into a 
profile database to construct a line-up.  
 The experimenter returned, told the participant, ‘what I am about to show you is a photo 
line-up. When you see it, I want you to point to the photograph of the person who came in the 
room and tell me the number underneath that photo,’ and presented a target-absent line-up to the 
participant. Biased instructions were used to ensure a selection. After the participant chose a 
photograph from the line-up, the experimenter procured the participant’s telephone number to 
conduct a follow-up interview two days later. If a participant did not choose a photograph, they 
were immediately debriefed. Participants were thanked and dismissed. 
 Phase 2.  Two days later, the experimenter called participants, thanked them again for 
their help in the simulated criminal investigation, and explained that the laptop was tracked 
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through its wireless card and was found in the possession of a Mr. Tom Armstrong, another 
student taking part in the mock criminal investigation. Participants were informed that Mr. 
Armstrong was ‘arrested and booked’ for being in possession of stolen property and that during 
the course of his interrogation admitted to buying the laptop from someone for $100.  
Participants were then told either (a) that Mr. Armstrong indicated that the person who stole the 
laptop and sold it to him was a Ms. Janet Pickett, and Ms. Pickett was the person selected from 
the line-up (i.e., ‘snitch’ confirming feedback), (b) that Mr. Armstrong indicated that the person 
who stole the laptop and sold it to him was a Ms. Janet Pickett, but Ms. Picket was not the person 
selected from the line-up (i.e., “snitch” disconfirming feedback), (c) that Mr. Armstrong refused 
to identify the person who sold him the laptop but Ms. Janet Pickett, the woman selected from 
the line-up, admitted to stealing the laptop (i.e., confession), or (d) that Mr. Armstrong refused to 
identify the person who stole the laptop and sold it to him (i.e., no feedback).  
 After providing the feedback, the experimenter asked questions from Wells and 
Bradfield’s (1998) post-identification feedback survey, with one question added at the end 
measuring whether the feedback influenced responses to any of the previous questions. These 
questions are shown in Table 1. After collecting demographic information, participants were 
debriefed and were asked not to disclose any details regarding the experiment to anyone else 
who might be eligible to participate.  
Results 
 The purpose of the present study was to see whether the classic post-identification 
feedback effect can occur when feedback comes from a secondary source such as a 
coconspirator.  The questions from the follow-up interview are found in Table 1 along with the 
means and standard deviations to their raw responses for each of the three feedback conditions. 
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For data analyses, a z-score for each response was calculated, and questions 7 and 8 were 
reverse-scored because high scores on these items indicated greater difficulty in identification in 
contrast to the rest of the questions.  
Analysis of Survey Items 
A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of 
feedback condition on retrospective confidence, F(3, 189) = 4.45, MSE = 1.83, p = .005, ηp2 = 
.066.  Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests indicated that scores for retrospective confidence were 
significantly lower in the disconfirming feedback condition than in the confession condition, p = 
.003.  Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p’s > .10.    
Because other items on the survey did not directly measure retrospective confidence, a 
mean of the z-scores for the remaining 11 questions was calculated and used for the second 
analysis.  A univariate ANOVA revealed a effect of feedback condition on the averaged scores, 
F(3, 189) = 5.24, MSE = 0.264, p = .002, ηp2 = .077.  Honestly significant difference (HSD) post 
hoc tests revealed that the average of the scores of the remaining items was significantly lower in 
the disconfirming feedback condition than in the snitch confirming feedback condition, p = .007, 
and confession condition, p = .002.  Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p’s > 
.10.   
A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of feedback condition on the 
manipulation check question asking whether the feedback influenced answers to the preceding 
questions, F(3, 189) = 5.70, MSE = 2.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .083.  Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tests 
indicated that feedback in the No Feedback condition was rated as significantly less influential 
than Snitch Confirming, p = .008, Confession, p = .026, and Disconfirming, p = .001.  
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Remaining pairwise comparisons were nonsignificant, p’s > .75.  This result is expected, given 
that no feedback would be perceived as less influential than any feedback.      
Factor Analysis 
 We conducted a varimax-rotated principal component analysis on the z-scores for each 
response to extract components loaded onto the individual items.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure indicated good sampling adequacy at KMO = .87, and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity showed that correlations were sufficiently large for a principal component analysis, χ2 
= 677.13, p < .001.  The analysis retained only those components with eigenvalues greater than 
1, and four components were extracted that together explained 63.85% of the variance (see Table 
2).  Component 1 included items highly correlated (>|.5|) with confidence and explained 35.79% 
of the variance, Component 2 included items highly correlated with difficulty in line-up selection 
and explained 10.73% of the variance, and Component 3 contained only the item asking how 
long the participant looked at the thief and explained 8.93% of the variance, and Component 4 
included the items asking about distance from confederate and what method the participant used 
to reach a line-up decision and explained 8.41% of the variance.  Regression scores for the 
factors were saved for further analyses.   
Analysis of Regression Scores 
 A univariate ANOVA was carried out on Component 1, revealing a significant effect of 
feedback condition on confidence and its related questions, F(3, 189) = 7.83, MSE = .904, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .111.  HSD post hoc tests showed that the effect was driven by significantly lower 
confidence in the disconfirming feedback condition than in the snitch confirming feedback 
condition, p < .001, confession condition, p < .001, and no feedback condition, p = .02.  
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Remaining pairwise comparisons revealed no further significant differences.  Means are 
displayed in Figure 1.   
ANOVAs revealed no significant effects of feedback condition on regression scores from 
Component 2, F(3, 189) = 0.82, MSE = 1.00, p > .45, ηp2 = .013, Component 3, F(3, 189) = 1.29, 
MSE = .97, p = > .25, ηp2 = .020, or Component 4, F(3, 189) = 1.11, MSE = 1.00, p = > .35, ηp2 = 
.017.  
General Discussion 
The post-identification feedback effect is a robust phenomenon that has motivated several 
investigations over the course of the previous 15 years (Steblay, Wells, & Douglass, 2014). We 
set out to see whether this effect would remain robust if the feedback was given from a 
secondary source, such as a snitch or coconspirator.  Other research has demonstrated the 
powerful effect that secondary confessions can have on mock jurors (Neuschatz et al., 2008; 
Wetmore et al., 2013) thus we predicted it would have a similar effect in the present study. 
Of particular concern to this study was how feedback from a secondary source would 
influence the witnessing experience. Contrary to our predictions, confirming feedback given by a 
snitch did not significantly elevate confidence nor did it influence the rest of the witnessing 
experience measures. Interestingly, witnesses that received confession (primary or secondary) 
information were no more confident in their identification decision than those who did not 
receive any feedback. This finding was unexpected and counters a large body of research 
examining the influence of confirmatory feedback on retrospective judgements (Steblay et al., 
2014). However, in the vein of previous post-identification feedback findings (e.g., Charman & 
Wells, 2012; Steblay et al., 2014; Wells & Bradfield, 1998), those witnesses who received 
disconfirming feedback from a snitch (e.g., ‘The person found with the stolen laptop was not the 
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person you selected from the line-up’) were less confident in their identification decision than 
those receiving primary confession feedback. In addition, this type of disconfirming feedback 
distorted the witnessing report. Eyewitnesses’ retrospective scores were lower when snitches 
offered disconfirming feedback than they were for eyewitnesses that received confirming snitch 
and confession feedback. The effects of disconfirming feedback have been more difficult to 
demonstrate across studies (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells et al.., 2003). These smaller effects 
have, in part, been thought to depend on how the disconfirming feedback is worded (Charman & 
Wells, 2012). We used similar methods (i.e., biased instructions) to those used by Charman and 
Wells (2012) and were also able to demonstrate the deflating effects feedback can have on 
retrospective confidence. Nevertheless, we were unable to find the typical confirming feedback 
effects. We explore why this might be below. 
The current experiment did not find evidence for the proposed cue-accessibility 
hypothesis (Charman & Wells, 2011; Wells & Bradfield, 1999) wherein confirming feedback 
distorts the witnessing report because witnesses’ internal memory cues are weak thereby 
providing evidence of a weak ecphoric experience. Thus, it is plausible that our confirming 
feedback manipulation did not have a potent effect because our eyewitnesses had strong internal 
memories initially, thus any confirming feedback was not strong enough to inflate confidence. In 
other words, our witnesses were not reliant on the confirming feedback as an external cue while 
reflecting on their certainty, attention, and so on. Charman and Wells (2011) have suggested that 
differences in encoding, retention interval and suspect-foil similarity are likely to contribute to 
the overall ecphoric experience of witnesses and these differences could have driven the current 
findings. 
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This study provides a number of interesting research avenues to be explored. Similar to 
Hasel and Kassin (2009), our witnesses were given various forms of feedback following their 
identification decision. Our study differs from theirs in that their study was primarily interested 
in investigating the influence of primary confession evidence and whether witnesses would 
change their identification decision following feedback one week later, whereas ours was 
directly concerned with the influence of feedback on retrospective confidence. Hence, it would 
be worthwhile include a secondary confession condition thereby examining whether this, too, 
would taint not only their confidence but also their identification decisions. 
Implication 
 To help protect against the effects of feedback on retrospective confidence, a confidence 
statement should be secured at the time of the identification (Technical Working Group for 
Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Obtaining this initial statement could help protect against the 
effects of any subsequent feedback given by police or a coconspirator. Moreover, this statement 
would provide a record that could be indexed during the time of trial wherein a witness might 
display high confidence while being cross-examined despite initially having low confidence at 
the time of the identification. Feedback given by police and information from coconspirators is 
unlikely to disappear from the justice system. Thus, it is critical for jurors, lawyers and judges to 
be informed about the biasing qualities that these two types of information can have on 
witnesses. 
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Table 1: Raw means and standard deviations for followup questions (N = 149). 
 Feedback 
Survey Question Snitch Confirming  Disconfirming Confession No Feedback 
At the time you made your 
identification, how certain were you 
that you were identifying the correct 
person? (1= not at all certain; 7= 
absolutely certain) 
M = 4.41, SD = 1.24 M = 3.79, SD = 1.52 M = 4.76, SD = 1.32 M = 4.13, SD = 1.33 
How good a view did you get of the 
person who stole the laptop? (1= 
very poor; 7= very good) 
M = 3.98, SD = 1.45 M = 3.47, SD = 1.44 M = 3.89, SD = 1.32 M = 3.94, SD = 1.31 
How much time did you spend 
looking at the face of the person who 
stole the laptop? (indicate to the 
nearest second) 
M = 5.95, SD = 12.92 M = 6.75, SD = 10.64 M = 7.24, SD = 10.70 M = 6.84, SD = 11.96 
How far away from you was the 
person who stole the laptop (indicate 
to the nearest inch)? 
M = 21.86, SD = 11.24 M = 24.98, SD = 11.49 M = 26.27, SD = 12.11 M = 24.69, SD = 10.63 
How much attention were you 
paying to the face of the person who 
stole the laptop? (1= none; 7= my 
total attention) 
M = 2.79, SD = 1.29 M = 2.72, SD = 1.47 M = 3.31, SD = 1.61 M = 2.94, SD = 1.16 
To what extent do you feel you had 
enough basis (enough information) to 
make an identification? (1= no basis 
at all; 7= a very good basis) 
M = 4.33, SD = 1.25 M = 3.26, SD = 1.34 M = 4.33, SD = 1.45 M = 3.90, SD = 1.26 
How easy or difficult was it for you 
to figure out which person in the 
photos was the person who stole the 
laptop? (1= extremely easy; 7= 
extremely difficult) 
M = 4.33, SD = 1.52 M = 5.21, SD = 1.38 M = 4.27, SD = 1.72 M = 4.77, SD = 1.48 
After you were first shown the 
photos, how long did it take you to 
make an identification? (indicate to 
the nearest second) 
M = 36.09, SD = 35.60 M = 56.02, SD = 74.40 M = 42.41, SD = 49.40 M = 51.83, SD = 56.44 
How willing would you be to testify 
in court that the person you identified 
was the person took the laptop? (1= 
not at all willing; 7= totally willing) 
M = 4.35, SD = 1.95 M = 2.44, SD = 1.48 M = 4.04, SD = 1.88 M = 3.38, SD = 1.96 
Generally, how good is your 
recognition memory for the faces of 
strangers you have encountered on 
only one prior occasion? (1= very 
poor; 7= excellent) 
M = 4.78, SD = 1.25 M = 3.78, SD = 1.47 M = 4.55, SD = 1.46 M = 4.38, SD = 1.52 
How clear is the image you have in 
memory of the person who stole the 
laptop? (1= not at all clear; 7= very 
clear) 
M = 4.04, SD = 1.47 M = 3.15, SD = 1.69 M = 3.80, SD = 1.65 M = 4.02, SD = 1.63 
When deciding which photo to pick, 
did you use a process of elimination 
or did the photo you picked just ‘pop 
out’ at you? (1= process of 
elimination; 7= just ‘popped out’ at 
me) 
M = 2.80, SD = 2.35 M = 3.34, SD = 2.74 M = 3.14, SD = 2.65 M = 3.08, SD = 2.66 
Did hearing that (condition) 
influence the way you answered any 
of the previous questions? (1=no 
influence; 7=completely influenced) 
M = 2.63, SD = 1.52 M = 2.83, SD = 1.75 M = 2.51, SD = 1.78 M = 1.60, SD = 1.16 
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Table 2: Component loadings based on a varimax rotated principal components analysis on the z-
scores for the 12 items on the followup questionnaire (N = 193). 
 Component  
Variable 1 2 3 4 h2 
Confidence      
At the time you made your identification, how certain were you that you 
were identifying the correct person?  
.722    .661 
How good a view did you get of the person who stole the laptop? .589    .613 
How much attention were you paying to the face of the person who stole 
the laptop? 
.545    .468 
To what extent do you feel you had enough basis (enough information) to 
make an identification?  
.801    .765 
How willing would you be to testify in court that the person you 
identified was the person took the laptop?  
.810    .660 
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of 
strangers you have encountered on only one prior occasion?  
.667    .570 
How clear is the image you have in memory of the person who stole the 
laptop?  
.751    .576 
Selection Difficulty      
How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which person in the 
photos was the person who stole the laptop?  
 .614   .541 
After you were first shown the photos, how long did it take you to make 
an identification? (indicate to the nearest second) 
 .878   .785 
Distance and Method of Selection      
When deciding which photo to pick, did you use a process of elimination 
or did the photo you picked just ‘pop out’ at you?  
   .692 .625 
How far away from you was the person who stole the laptop (indicate to 
the nearest inch)? 
   .772 .634 
Time Spent Looking at Individual      
How much time did you spend looking at the face of the person who stole 
the laptop? (indicate to the nearest second) 
  .868  .762 
Note: Component loadings < |.5| are suppressed.  Bolded loadings are marker variables.  h2 is the communality 
coefficient. 
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Figure 1. Average coefficients with standard error bars for Component 1, which captured survey 
items related to confidence in each feedback condition. 
 
